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United States – Cuba: a New Deal?
Isabelle Vagnoux et Janette Habel
Traduction : Michael Hinchliffe
1 “But there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple severed
by the tempest from its native tree can not choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly
disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support,
can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which by the same law of nature
cannot cast her off from its bosom.” So predicted American Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams (Adams J.Q., 1823) with regard to the island of Cuba situated less than
170 kms from Key West. Quincy’s “political gravitation” principle applied to a territory
considered by some as Florida’s southern shore has taken root and made its mark on
the  asymmetrical,  intimate  and  passionate  relationship  between  Washington  and
Havana, a relationship often fraught with conflict, never a subject of indifference.
2  Nineteenth  century  US  expansionist  ambitions;  “civilizing  mission”;  “aid”  towards
Cuban  independence  in  1898;  military  occupation  with  attendant  economic
appropriation; establishment of de facto dependence (in a letter to president Theodore
Roosevelt on October 28, 1901, General Wood did indeed write : “There is, of course,
little  or  no real  independence left  Cuba under the Platt  Amendment,”  (Schoultz  L.,
2009:  24));  irritation  in  Washington  (in  1906  Theodore  Roosevelt  expressed  his
exasperation to his friend Henry L. White: “I am so angry with that infernal little Cuban
republic that I would like to wipe its people off the face of the earth” (Schoultz L., 2009:
25));  support extended to Americanized Cuban political  leaders;  a  long concomitant
tradition of refuge in the US for Cuban dissidents, whether in opposition to Spain, to
certain presidents or,  later,  to the Castrist regime: thus could be sketched the bold
outlines of a very intimate, bilateral history. Can Cuba be seen as a US “neo-colony”?
Possibly it can, in many respects. Historian Hugh Thomas (1974) writes of “the United
States administration’s identification with Batista via his ambassadors and the colonels
of the military mission”. Washington’s support of Batista’s dictatorship never really
ceased. The weapons embargo set up in March 1958, “too little, too late” (Luxenberg A.,
1991), was not respected. The US military mission continued training Batistiano troops
right up to the final offensive against Castro (Smith W., 1987).
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3  The  triumph  of  the  revolution  in  1959  marked  a  radical  break  in  the  American
domination  of  Cuba.  Washington  nevertheless  attempted  to  ride  this  change  by
appointing  a  new  ambassador,  Philip  Bonsal,  a  career  diplomat  and  Latin  America
specialist  who  contrasted  with  his  predecessors,  all  far  more  concerned  with  US
economic interests than with diplomacy. When the líder máximo made a non-official
visit to the East Coast and met with vice-president Nixon in April 1959, history was not
pre-ordained. In a summary written for President Eisenhower, Nixon, for all his well-
known anti-communist sentiments, wrote: “Whatever we may think of him, he is going
to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American
affairs generally. He seems sincere. He is either incredibly naive about communism or
under communist discipline – my guess is the former. […] We have no choice but at
least  to  try  to  orient  him in  the  right  direction.”  (Nixon R.,  1978:  202;  CIA,  2013).
Ambassador Bonsal agreed with this judgment: “there was not sufficient evidence” in
the spring of  1959  to  denounce Castro’s  “secret  communism” (Bonsal  P.,  1971:  60).
Better still, there were CIA agents who nursed hopes of conducting regular exchanges
with Castro about goings on in Moscow and Beijing (Bonsal P., 1971:64-65). In May 1959
the agrarian reform was promulgated leading to the expropriation of estates over 400
hectares with effects especially on the large American sugar plantations such as United
Fruit.  Compensations were to  take the form of  20 year  reimbursable  treasury bills.
Washington demanded swift and effective compensation. For Castro, it was a question
of take it or leave it. These developments signaled the beginnings of hostility between
the two countries. In December 1960, against the opinion of Ambassador Bonsal, the
United  States  stopped  importing  Cuban  sugar,  whereupon  Havana  and  Moscow
published a common communiqué. Diplomatic relations were severed in 1961 with the
Washington-imposed embargo already operative. In the context of the Cold War, the
Cuba – USSR rapprochement constituted what was probably the direst strategic threat
ever experienced by the United States. The Soviet Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the
paroxystic moment in a standoff  between two super powers in which Havana itself
played a very secondary role (Touze V., 2012). The worst —nuclear war— avoided, the
two  super  powers  agreed  to  concessions.  Washington  undertook  to  engage  in  no
military intervention in Cuba, in other words to avoid repeating the previous year’s
disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. But with Havana providing active aid to revolutionary
movements in Latin America and Africa, Washington sought other means of dealing
with the Cuban nuisance. In 1963, Kennedy stated: “I don’t accept the view that Mr.
Castro is  going to be in power in 5 years” (Kennedy J.F.,  1963) and all  means were
deployed against him: throughout the sixties, the embargo and assassination attempts
(U.S Congress, 1975: 71-80), and from the 80s onward, diplomatic isolation and media
pounding (Radio and later Televisión Martí). All to no avail.
4  From crisis situations to secret negotiations and overtures, the half-century after the
Cuban revolution appears as a long succession of lost opportunities, the outcome of
which could have been different (NSA, 2003; NSA, 2009; LeoGrande W. & Kornbluh P.,
2015). Various Latin American countries were active on the sidelines. Brazil and Mexico
in particular  (the latter  never having broken off  diplomatic  relations with Havana)
constantly offered mediation.  It  was partly pressure from Latin American countries
that led the Organization of American States to rescind the exclusion of Cuba in 2009.
At the same time, discreet negotiations between Cuba and the US resulted in significant
agreements  on  the  subject  of  migration  or  technical  questions  in  a  double-sided
relationship that works rather better than official  discourse would admit.  However,
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aside  from a  limited  lessening  in  some areas  of  commerce,  the  economic  embargo
remains in place. Since the 1996 Helms-Burton Act (US Congress, 1996) it can no longer
be cancelled by the executive without congressional consent.
5  A new stage was reached in 2006 when Fidel, a sick man, withdrew from the exercise of
power while retaining the title of head of state. His brother Raúl assumed power and in
2008  became  official  president.  Although  Raúl  Castro  has  operated  an  economic
opening of Cuba, the country’s political system has seen little significant change, even
if  political  prisoners  are  occasionally  liberated and the population no longer  needs
authorization to travel outside Cuba. The thawing of relationships between Cuba and
the US that seemed so often about to occur was set to do just that in April 2009 when
Barack Obama announced: “The United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba”, while
recognizing it  would take time “to overcome decades of mistrust” (Obama B. 2009).
Hoping that people to people contacts, openings and exchanges are better vectors of
progress than isolation and repression and that they would finally bring to an end the
curtailment of democratic freedoms and human rights, Obama slashed a large hole in
the  repressive  arsenal  deployed  against  Cuba.  However,  in  December  2009,  the
imprisonment by Cuba of Alan Gross1, an American citizen accused of espionage, put
this first phase on hold. There were heated debates in Washington between Cuban-
Americans favoring a hardline approach seeking the overthrow of the regime and the
proponents of an open position. The second group were motivated not by philanthropy
but by hard-headed economic and political realism. With Cuba opening up to foreign
investment, there were plenty of American firms and investors keen to join in. And as
Obama himself has put it “the notion that the same policies that we put in place in 1961
would somehow still be as effective as they are today in the age of the Internet and
Google and world travel doesn’t make sense.” (Obama B., 2013).
6  Finally, as a result of an intervention by Pope Francis, History moved a little faster.
Alan Gross was liberated in December 2014 and on December 17 (“17D”),  President
Obama announced the decision to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba, to remove
Cuba from the list of terrorist supporting states, to increase the number of journeys,
the  volume  of  trade  and  the  flow  of  information  towards  Cuba.  In  April  2015,
Washington agreed to  Cuban participation  in  the  Summit  of  the  Americas  and the
presidents of both countries met on an historic occasion.
7 In August that year, an American Secretary of State trod the soil of Havana for the first
time since 1945. John Kerry made the trip for the official inauguration of the American
embassy. In March 2016 on the occasion of the first state visit of an American president
to Cuba, Barrack Obama proclaimed: “I have come here to bury the last remnant of the
Cold War in the Americas. I have come here to extend the hand of friendship to the
Cuban people.” (Obama B., 2016). He addressed to Congress an exhortation to remove
the embargo. A new era, it seemed, had dawned.
8  The idea of the present dossier on the historic change in bilateral relations between
these two “intimate enemies” (Pérez-Stable M., 2010) was conceived at a time when,
diplomatic relations having been re-established, normalization appeared to be well on
course,  barring  predictable  blockages,  particularly  in  the  US  Congress.  The  ground
covered in recent years could not have been covered without an alinement of favorable
planets (a reshuffle in the composition of the Cuban-American community; pressure
brought to bear by US businesses; the economic necessity of the opening initiated by
Raúl  Castro;  the  gap  left  by  the  weakening  of  allies  such  as  the  USSR  and  later
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Venezuela; the determination of Latin American countries to put an end to an historical
aberration) and the will  of  two men, Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro.  “It
takes two to dance a tango”. But the dynamic they set in motion has suddenly shifted
into lower gear. Recent developments in 2017 make our present project appear in a less
optimistic light and justify the question mark in its title. We have president Trump
determined to undo much of what his predecessor put in place (White House, 2017), a
Republican majority  in  both houses  of  Congress  which will  make the  lifting  of  the
embargo much more difficult  to bring about, and we have the mysterious ailments
suffered  by  American  diplomats  posted  to  Havana  (Sullivan  M.,  2017)  which  have
markedly slowed down activity in the newly opened embassy. Raúl Castro, the other
protagonist of the rapprochement is set to quit the presidency in April 2018, though,
for the time being, he will remain first secretary of the Communist party (CCP). A new
generation is coming to power in Havana and the post-Castro era is already under way.
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  current  slow-down,  the  winds  of  History  are  blowing,
driving in the direction of normalized relations. A page turns slowly.
9  This trilingual collection offers nine papers from French, Dutch, German, Canadian and
American researchers, all specialists of Cuba or international relations, focusing on the
decisive  factors  within  each  country  presiding  over  the  decision  to  move  towards
normalized relations, looking also at outside support for the process (from Canada, the
Vatican, Latin America, the European Union) and concluding with a double analysis of
the prospects of an evolution in relations under the Trump administration.
10  Political analyst Janette Habel contributes the only article centered completely on the
Cuban  perspective.  In  it  she  shows  how  the  process  of  internal  reform,  the  new
aspirations  of  the  population,  but  also  the  serious  difficulties  faced  by  Brazil  and
Venezuela, allies (and providers of support) induced Raúl Castro to seek an historic
evolution in relations with the US, moreover at a favorable juncture when, for the first
time, Washington was no longer demanding regime change or in-depth political reform
as a pre-requisite to negociation, even if that aim had not been set aside. From the
American  perspective,  Ted  Pïccone,  program  director  at  the  Brookings  think-tank,
analyses the reasons why several US interest groups in favor of normalizing relations
with Cuba succeeded in gaining the upper hand over policies in place since the sixties
and in influencing strategy at the highest level. A third actor is the Cuban American
diaspora, notably Florida based, whose members, after exerting decades-long influence
over  Washington  in  favor  of  severity,  are  now  far  more  inclined  to  envisage  new
openings  in  bilateral  relations.  This  recent  development  is  studied  by  American
sociologist  Guillermo  Grenier  using  opinion  polls  on  Cuba  carried  out  at  regular
intervals over a period of twenty years by the International University of Florida (FIU
Cuba Poll).
11  The process of normalization, however, has also been edified on the strength of outside
influences that have, with varying results, worked towards ending an anomalous post-
Cold War situation. Canadian political analyst Gordon Mace describes in minute detail
how on several occasions in the course of the past half century Ottawa has attempted to
bring about a rapprochement with Cuba and to convince Washington to do likewise.
But  by  misfortune,  just  as  Obama  began  doing  just  that,  the  tendency  under  the
conservative  government  of  Stephen  Harper  was  rather  towards  a  hardening  of
relations thus blocking any concerted approach. The Vatican, on the other hand, on the
strength  of  successful  interventions  in  1998  and  2012  by  Popes  John-Paul  II  and
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Benedict  XVI,  has  played  a  not  inconsiderable  role  under  the  first  Latin  American
pontiff Pope Francis, via Monsignor Ortega, archbishop of Havana. Maria Gayte, who
specializes  in  Washington  –  Vatican  relations,  provides  an  analysis  of  pontifical
mediation  with  reference  to  the  diplomatic  priorities  of  the  Holy  See.  The  Latin
American context  is  equally  important,  with Latin America clearly favorable to the
reinstatement of Cuba in the hemispheric concert of nations and to rapprochement
with Washington after decades of Cuban “soft power” and the normalization of her
relations  with  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  states.  Dutch  historian  Dirk  Kruijt
describes the “long trek” involved here. Following Latin America’s lead, the European
Union also appears to usher Washington towards normalization while at the same time
playing its own card as “third strategic actor” of an asymmetrical triangle in which a
Europe  in  favor  of  compromise  oscillates,  as  political  analyst  Susanne  Gratius
demonstrates,  between  alinement  with  Washington  or  alinement  with  Havana  as
circumstances and its own interior balance of political power dictate.
12  The concluding pieces by two American political scientists deal with the direction of
US  –  Cuba  relations  in  the  context  of  the  Trump  presidency.  William  LeoGrande
describes how what Obama held to be an “irreversible” evolution is being unraveled by
the  Trump  Administration,  although  there  exist  both  disagreement  within  the
Administration  and,  without,  certain  political  forces  preventing  the  new  president
from wreaking complete havoc in his predecessor’s achievements. In his contribution,
Jorge I. Dominguez stresses how little Cuba matters to Trump. He argues that Cuba’s
lack  of  strategic  importance  is  the  factor  that  allows  Washington  once  more,  as
previously under G.W. Bush, to call into question the validity of the island’s political
system.  Today,  he  contends,  anything  could  happen,  from  restricted,  pragmatic
cooperation based on common interests to ideological confrontation and possibly even
a fresh severing of diplomatic relations.
13 To write on current affairs is to run the risk of having to update what is written at the
last minute. We should like to thank our authors for having undertaken this demanding
task so as to be able to present to our readers material in direct contact with the latest
developments. The opinions expressed here are the sole responsibility of each author.
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Adams, John Quincy, Letter from John Quincy Adams, U.S. Secretary of State, to Hugh Nelson,
American Minister in Madrid, April 28, 1823, dans Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Writings of
John Quincy Adams, vol. 7, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917, p. 373.
Bonsal, Philip W., Cuba, Castro, and the United States, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press,
1971.
CIA, « Richard M. Nixon's memorandum on meeting with Fidel Castro, April 19, 1959 », 2013. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85-00664R000200130001-5.pdf, consulté
le 23 septembre 2017. 
United States – Cuba: a New Deal?
IdeAs, 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
5
Kennedy, John F., « Remarks and Question and Answer Period Before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors », 19 avril 1963, The American Presidency Project, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9154, page consultée le 26 novembre 2017.
LeoGrande, William M & Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba. The Hidden History of Negotiations
between Washington and Havana, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2015.
Luxenberg, Alan, « Did Eisenhower push Castro into the arms of the Soviets ? » dans Irving
Horowitz (dir.), Cuban Communism, Transaction Publishers 1991.
National Security Archive, Kate Doyle, « Double Dealing. Mexico's Foreign Policy Toward Cuba »,
2 mars 2003
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB83/index.htm, consulté le 3 novembre 2017
National Security Archive, Kate Doyle, « Cuba and the United States. Road Map on efforts to
improve relations revealed in declassified documents », 22 janvier 2009 https://
nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB269/index.htm, consulté le 3 novembre 2017
Nixon, Richard, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1978.
Obama, Barack, « Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony »,
17 avril 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
summit-americas-opening-ceremony, page consultée le 20 novembre 2017.
Obama, Barack, « Remarks by the President at a DSCC Fundraising Reception Miami », Florida, 8
novembre 2013, http://www.reobama.com/remarks-by-the-president-at-a-dscc-fundraising-
reception/, page consultée le 15 décembre 2017
Obama, Barack, « Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes », 17 décembre 2014, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-
policy-changes, page consultée le 20 novembre 2017
Obama, Barack, « Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba », 22 mars 2016, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/22/remarks-president-obama-people-
cuba, page consultée le 20 novembre 2017.
Pérez-Stable, Marifeli, The United States and Cuba: Intimate Enemies, New York, Routledge, 2010.
Schoultz, Lars, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic. The United States and the Cuban Revolution, Chapel
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
Smith, Wayne, The Closest of Enemies. A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations Since
1957, New York, Norton, 1987
Stoehr, John, « The real story behind Alan Gross's work in Cuba », The Hill, 27 janvier 2015, 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/230794-the-real-story-behind-alan-grosss-
work-in-cuba, page consultée le 18 décembre 2017.
Sullivan, Mark P., « Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress », CRS Report for Congress, 4 janvier 2011, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40193.pdf, page consultée le 18 décembre 2017.
Sullivan, Mark P., « U.S. Response to Injuries of U.S. Embassy Personnel in Havana, Cuba », CRS
Insight, 6 octobre 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10798.pdf, page consultée le 20 novembre
2017.
Thomas, Hugh, Cuba : la lucha por la libertad, New York,Vintage español, Random House, 2013.
Touze, Vincent, Missiles et décisions: Castro, Kennedy et Khrouchtchev et la crise de Cuba d'octobre 1962,
Paris, André Versaille éditeur, 2012.
United States – Cuba: a New Deal?
IdeAs, 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
6
U.S. Congress, Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. An Interim Report of the
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th
Congress, 1st session, 20 novembre 1975.
U.S. Congress, Public law 104-114, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 104th
Congress, 12 mars 1996, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ114/PLAW-104publ114.pdf,
page consultée le 2 décembre 2017.
White House, « Fact Sheet on Cuba Policy », 16 juin 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/06/16/fact-sheet-cuba-policy, page consultée le 20 novembre 2017.
NOTES
1. Alan Gross was a subcontractor for the USAID agency. For the debate on what he was doing,
see Sullivan M., 2011; Stoehr J., 2015.
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